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I
n 2005, nearly 700,000 households entered the mort-
gage  foreclosure  process  in  the  United  States,  and 
nearly 10 times as many households were behind on 
their mortgage payments.1 While this represents a rela-
tively low percentage of the total mortgages serviced, the 
costs of foreclosure can be substantial, and not only for the 
families who lose their homes. Research suggests that lend-
ers can lose an average of $44,000 to $58,000 per completed 
foreclosure, depending on the circumstances.2 And cities 
lose money too—estimates of losses to local municipalities 
range from $400 to $34,000 per foreclosure.3 Foreclosures 
may have other negative impacts as well, as vacant proper-
ties can become sites of crime and distress.4 Taken together, 
these consequences yield a strong rationale for lenders and 
local  governments  to  work  together  with  nonprofits  and 
families to prevent foreclosure. 
Within the Federal Reserve’s 12th District, the issue of 
foreclosure prevention has not been as prominent as in some 
other parts of the country. The rapid rates of house price ap-
preciation in California, Nevada, Arizona, Washington and 
Oregon have likely hidden borrower distress, since families 
delinquent on their mortgage payments have been able to 
sell their properties quickly and most likely at a profit. Over-
all, rates of delinquency and foreclosure in the 12th District 
are lower than the U.S. as a whole. Yet if the housing market 
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cools, and as adjustable-rate or interest-only mortgages reset, 
many borrowers may suddenly face mortgage default and 
foreclosure and risk losing the equity that they have gained. 
This is of particular concern for borrowers in the subprime 
market. (See Figure 2.1: Trends in Borrower Distress, The 
Federal Reserve’s 12th District)
In this article, we look at some of the recent innovations 
in policies and programs across the country that address   
homeownership  preservation.  From  pre-purchase  home-
ownership  counseling  to  state  policies  that  help  to  limit 
predatory  lending,  these  initiatives  show  the  range  of 
possible interventions and partners that can help to keep 
families in their homes. Expanding and replicating these 
efforts within the 12th District could help more families to 
keep their homes and to continue to build equity.
Pre-Purchase Counseling
Given the bewildering array of mortgage products avail-
able—and the potential for falling victim to predatory lend-
ers—there is a clear need for more pre-purchase homeowner-
ship counseling that will help families successfully navigate 
the  mortgage  market.  Evidence  suggests  that  as  many  as 
one-third to one-half of subprime borrowers could qualify 
for prime loans. Many borrowers—particularly low-income 
and minority families who have been traditionally excluded 
Figure 2.1    Trends in Borrower Distress, The Federal Reserve’s 12th District
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Percent of Home Mortgage Loans Past Due, 2005from  access  to  credit—lack  the  information  they  need  to 
choose the best mortgage product for their financial situ-
ation.5 For example, researchers have found that compared 
to prime borrowers, subprime borrowers are less knowledge-
able about the mortgage process, less likely to search for the 
best mortgage rates, and less likely to be offered a choice 
among alternative mortgage terms and instruments.6
Pre-purchase  homeownership  counseling  can  help  to 
mediate these information asymmetries and ensure that bor-
rowers have the information they need to make good deci-
sions. However, the evidence on the success of counseling 
is mixed.7 One of the difficulties of measuring the impact 
of  counseling  programs  is  that  the  quality  of  counseling 
can vary, and researchers have pointed out that there is an 
important distinction between providing information and 
providing education.8 Yet studies have found that counsel-
ing, particularly face-to-face counseling, can improve loan 
performance and lead to lower rates of delinquency and   
default.9  Increasing  the  amount  of  funding  available  for 
homeownership counseling would increase the reach and 
impact of these programs.
Across  the  country,  there  are  a  number  of  consumer 
education initiatives that are designed to inform borrow-
ers, increase their financial literacy, and protect them from 
predatory lenders. The U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) certifies agencies throughout 
the  country  that  provide  homeownership  counseling.10 
Through these HUD-approved agencies, counselors are able 
to review loan disclosure statements with clients and assist 
them in understanding the terms and conditions of the loan 
they are considering. The Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) also runs a Homebuyer Education Learning Program 
(HELP), which covers topics like budgeting, finding a home, 
getting a loan, and home maintenance. Completion of the 
program  may  entitle  the  homebuyer  to  a  reduced  initial 
FHA mortgage insurance premium.
For the vast majority of borrowers, however, education 
and counseling is only available if they seek it out proactive-
ly. One of the largest challenges facing the homeownership 
counseling field is reaching potential clients before they sign 
the loan documents. Increasingly, initiatives are develop-
ing large-scale marketing campaigns to educate consumers 
about mortgage lending. For example, to promote public 
awareness of predatory lending, Freddie Mac is rolling out 
a nationwide campaign called “Don’t Borrow Trouble”. In 
partnership with local governments and organizations, the 
campaign  uses  mailings,  public  service  announcements, 
transit ads and television commercials to inform the public 
about  predatory  practices,  and  also  provides  referrals  to 
counselors for additional support. (See Figure 2.2: “Don’t 
Borrow Trouble” Campaigns in the Federal Reserve’s 12th 
District)
In addition to educating consumers about the home 
buying process, a growing number of programs are focusing 
on post-purchase counseling, helping families after they’ve 
bought  a  home.  In  Minnesota,  the  Emerging  Markets 
Homeownership Initiative (EMHI) provides an interesting 
model that integrates both pre-purchase and post-purchase 
elements in its effort to help increase the homeownership 
rate among “emerging market” households,11 including mi-
norities and new immigrants.12 EMHI’s goal is to decrease 
racial and ethnic disparities in homeownership by address-
ing the barriers to homeownership that emerging market 
households face. But, rather than seeing homeownership as 
the end goal, EMHI’s business plan recognizes the need to 
sustain homeownership after initial purchase. The program 
will build on existing networks of service providers in Min-
nesota to provide training on home maintenance, house-
hold budgeting, and counseling on emerging debt or mort-
gage payment issues. The initiative is also looking at ways 
to offer households financial assistance, such as short-term 
loans to cover unanticipated expenses or income shortfalls, 
to keep them in homeownership.13 
A Focus on Foreclosure Prevention
While  counseling  is  clearly  important,  when  families 
enter into mortgage default or foreclosure proceedings, a 
more intensive strategy is usually called for. Increasingly, 
nonprofit organizations and government agencies are part-
nering with lenders to develop foreclosure avoidance pro-
grams that work directly with distressed borrowers to help 
keep them in their homes. These programs generally com-
bine  public  awareness  and  counseling  components  with 
mortgage workouts or rescue loans.
The  Home  Ownership  Preservation  Initiative  (HOPI) 
in Chicago provides an excellent example of this approach. 
Launched  in  2003  by  Neighborhood  Housing  Services 
(NHS) of Chicago in partnership with the City of Chicago, 
the Credit Counseling Resource Center and private sector 
financial institutions, HOPI incorporates a public awareness 
campaign, phone and face-to-face counseling, loan workouts 
to help prevent foreclosure, and reclamation of foreclosed 
homes to restore them as neighborhood assets. Recogniz-
ing that one of the largest challenges is reaching distressed 
Figure 2.2
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11 December 2006borrowers, HOPI launched a mortgage default hotline using 
Chicago’s non-emergency “311” telephone service. In addi-
tion, the City of Chicago sent 25,000 postcards promoting 
counseling to targeted zip codes, and used public service 
announcements, media events and bus and subway adver-
tisements to reach borrowers. To fund the initiative, NHS 
created a capital pool by establishing mortgage-backed cer-
tificates, funded with a three-year, $100 million commit-
ment from Chicago’s financial community and $3 million 
from the city’s CDBG fund.14 During the three year HOPI 
pilot phase, the program provided counseling and education 
to more than 4,300 families in Chicago, and helped to pre-
vent the foreclosure of more than 1,300 homes.15 
NeighborWorks  America,  NHS’s  parent  organization, 
recently launched the Center for Foreclosure Solutions to 
expand the HOPI model nationally. Beginning in Ohio, 
the Center is supporting a coordinated foreclosure preven-
tion and intervention strategy in communities nationwide. 
The  strategy  entails  a  widespread  public  outreach  cam-
paign.  In  partnership  with  the  Homeownership  Preserva-
tion Foundation, the Center promotes a toll-free hotline 
(1-888-995-HOPE) that offers free foreclosure prevention 
services and counseling to consumers. In addition to raising 
public awareness, the Center is working to build the capac-
Box 2.1 The Consumer Rescue Fund 1
In December 2003, Mr. Marigold2 was at risk of losing his home of more than 20 years. A series of events—including un-
anticipated medical expenses and a refinancing based on a fraudulent appraisal—had left Mr. Marigold unable to make the 
payments on an 11.6 percent APR, $67,500 loan, and unable to come up with the money to make the balloon payment 
of $29,325 due in April. Rather than foreclosing on the property, however, Mr. Marigold’s lender contacted the Consumer 
Rescue Fund (CRF). In collaboration with HSBC North America, the CRF was able to extend Mr. Marigold a loan of 
$77,000—enough to cover both the previous loan and the balloon payment—at a low APR of 6.99 percent, and keep him 
in his home. 
Mr. Marigold’s story illustrates how the CRF can help borrowers who are at risk of foreclosure due to predatory loans. 
Launched by the National Community Reinvestment Coalition in 2001, the CRF has helped more than 1,000 consumers 
in 17 states preserve their homes.3 The program is built on a strong partnership between NCRC, its member organizations, 
and HSBC North America. Often, the first line of defense is NCRC’s member organizations, predominately housing coun-
selors and community development corporations that work in the community. Through these community partners, NCRC’s 
Fair Lending specialists learn about families facing foreclosure and review their loan documents including the Good Faith 
Estimate and income verification statements. 
If the specialists conclude that the loans are predatory, there are a number of options to help the consumer, including:
	 Mediation. NCRC will work directly with the lender or servicer to have abusive terms eliminated and to prevent foreclosure 
proceedings.
	 An affordable refinance loan. NCRC has partnered with HSBC North America, which refinances the loans of predatory 
lending victims. The predatory loans are replaced with market-rate or below market-rate loans, and do not contain prepay-
ment penalties, balloon payments, or credit insurance.
	 Litigation. If NCRC discovers a pattern and practice of abusive lending or servicing on the part of a financial institution, 
NCRC will pursue legal redress and file a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
	 Financial education. NCRC will provide consumers with financial education as part of their case management work, guid-
ing them through the remediation process and coaching them on how to avoid predatory lending situations in the future. 
The CRF has had a significant impact on helping to preserve homeowner equity. A recent analysis shows that CRF rescue 
loans have helped to lower families’ interest rates by an average of 3.84 percent, decreasing their monthly payments by 
an average of $275 dollars. Particularly for low-income families, this reduction in the cost of credit can provide enormous 
benefits to household financial well-being and greatly increase the likelihood that they will keep their homes.
According to Josh Silver, the Vice President of Research and Policy at NCRC, one of the key challenges for CRF moving 
forward is to expand the scale at which the program operates. “We know that predatory practices are increasing, and we 
have a successful model that can help families preserve wealth,” said Silver. “What we’d like to see now is the participation 
of additional lenders in the program, and to expand our reach in states like California and Nevada.”
12   December 2006ity for foreclosure counseling at the local level, and is using   
research to help identify local “hotspots”—areas that are ex-
periencing a high concentration of foreclosure activity—for 
targeted interventions. 
Other organizations are also taking the lead on helping 
families  and  communities  prevent  foreclosure.  The  Con-
sumer Rescue Fund, spearheaded by the National Commu-
nity Reinvestment Coalition, focuses on helping families 
that have fallen victim to predatory loans. (See Box 2.1: 
The Consumer Rescue Fund) ACORN Housing—with local 
offices in Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon and Wash-
ington—has  similarly  launched  a  nationwide  foreclosure 
mitigation program.16 Financial institutions—in addition to 
helping to fund a wide range of foreclosure prevention ac-
tivities—have also begun to examine ways to help their own 
borrowers. (See Box 2.2: Asset Preservation Efforts and the 
Community Reinvestment Act) JPMorgan Chase, for exam-
ple, has established a Homeownership Preservation Office 
designed specifically to help Chase mortgage customers who 
are delinquent or at risk of foreclosure.17 
State and local governments are also developing innova-
tive programs to help borrowers who are facing foreclosure. 
Perhaps the only program of its kind in the nation, Penn-
sylvania’s  Homeowners  Emergency  Mortgage  Assistance 
Program (HEMAP) provides distressed borrowers with loans 
that bring their delinquent mortgage payments current to 
a specified date. For those who qualify, the program also 
offers continuing loans that subsidize borrowers’ monthly 
mortgage payments for a set time period. Counseling agen-
cies work out forbearance agreements with lenders and also 
counsel  families  regarding  their  financial  situations.  The 
program is funded by both state appropriations and the re-
payment of HEMAP loans.18
State and Federal Policies and Regulations
While pre- and post-purchase counseling and foreclo-
sure  prevention  initiatives  are  valuable  components  of  a 
homeownership preservation strategy, there is also a place 
for policies and regulations that prohibit predatory lend-
ing practices. Certain lending practices, such as prepayment 
penalties and balloon payments, are more likely to lead to 
foreclosures than loans without those terms, even after con-
trolling for key risk factors such as credit scores. Predatory 
lending—particularly with fraudulent intent—is a particularly 
serious problem that disproportionately affects low-income 
and minority borrowers. In these instances, access to credit 
works in direct opposition to the goals of asset building and 
community revitalization, and requires more intervention 
than just additional counseling.
Congress has enacted a wide range of federal laws and 
subsidy programs that affect the provision of credit and that 
serve to regulate and prohibit abusive lending practices. Mi-
chael Barr has usefully distinguished between the different 
regulations in the following way:19
	 Affirmative obligation,  like  the  Community  Rein-
vestment Act (CRA), which encourages federally in-
sured banks and thrifts to meet the credit needs of 
the  entire  communities  that  they  serve,  including 
low- and moderate-income areas;
	 Negative prohibition, like the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act (ECOA), which prohibits creditors from dis-
crimination based on “race, color, religion, national 
origin, sex or marital status, or age”;
	 Disclosure, which can either serve to inform the con-
sumer, like the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), or which 
Box 2.2 Asset Preservation Efforts and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 
Financial institutions are important partners in efforts to help preserve homeownership, particularly among low- and moder-
ate-income borrowers. Banks can receive CRA consideration for financial contributions that fund nonprofit credit counsel-
ing agencies that advise low- or moderate-income borrowers on homeownership issues.   For example, financial contribu-
tions to programs like Chicago’s HOPI “311” hotline and Freddie Mac’s “Don’t Borrow Trouble” can be CRA eligible when 
they help low- or moderate-income borrowers by providing financial counseling. Financial contributions from banks that 
help capitalize loan-rescue funds for low- or moderate-income borrowers mired in predatory loans can also receive CRA 
consideration.   Participation in a loan-rescue fund that is part of a municipal plan to revitalize and stabilize a low- or moder-
ate-income geography would also be viewed positively under CRA.
In addition, when banks must take a deed in lieu of foreclosure, the property can be donated, or sold at a discounted price, 
to a nonprofit community development organization for a qualified CRA purpose, such as providing affordable housing for 
low- or moderate-income homebuyers. For example, a bank could donate a vacant house to a nonprofit organization that 
would rehabilitate the property and sell it to a low- or moderate-income family for affordable housing. The transfer of such 
a property, when part of a formal revitalization and stabilization plan, also can help stabilize low- or moderate-income neigh-
borhoods when the nonprofit resells the home to new residents, preventing further neighborhood deterioration. 
Adapted from Karen Tucker (2006), “Compliance Corner—Homeownership: Preserving the American Dream”, The Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency Community Development Investments Online.
13 December 2006can increase the ability of the public, regulators, and 
fair lending enforcement agencies to assess whether 
lenders are engaged in discriminatory practices, like 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA); and
	 Product regulation, like the Home Ownership and 
Equity  Protection  Act  (HOEPA),  which  imposes 
product restrictions on certain categories of loans.
Barr also notes that subsidies, such as government in-
surance through the Federal Housing Administration and 
flexible underwriting criteria for loan purchases by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, can influence the supply of credit 
for homeownership. As a whole, these regulations and sub-
sidies have helped to increase access to credit in low-income 
and  minority  communities,  combat  discrimination,  and 
address market failures. And as Barr points out, these laws 
can reinforce one another; for example, disclosure laws can 
be used to enhance negative prohibitions regarding racial 
discrimination.20 
Yet,  many  advocates  and  researchers  argue  that  exist-
ing regulations don’t go far enough in protecting consum-
ers. Some note that TILA, for example, has not lived up 
to its goal of standardizing disclosures on the total cost of 
credit, since many closing costs are currently excluded when 
computing finance charges and annual percentage rates.21 
HOEPA, while placing restrictions on high-cost loans, does 
not apply to home purchase mortgages. HOEPA’s triggers 
have also come under critique as being too high.22 The chal-
lenge for policy-makers, however, is to balance the desire 
for consumer protection with the desire to provide broad 
access to credit, particularly among low-income and minor-
ity borrowers. Determining the right level of intervention 
is particularly difficult in high-cost real estate markets like 
California, where many families wouldn’t be able to get into   
homeownership at all without taking on high debt-to-income 
ratios or using nontraditional mortgage products. 
Still, as the use of alternative mortgage products and sub-
prime loans has grown, regulators and consumer advocates 
have expressed concern that consumers may not understand 
the risks of these products, and that there is a need to im-
prove  the  clarity  and  comprehensiveness  of  disclosures.23 
The federal banking regulators recently issued interagency 
guidance on alternative mortgage product lending that dis-
cusses underwriting guidelines, portfolio and risk manage-
ment, and consumer disclosure practices. (See article: Non-
traditional Mortgage Guidance) The Federal Reserve Board 
is also in the process of an extensive review of Regulation Z, 
and is considering changes to both the content and format 
of mortgage disclosures to improve their effectiveness.24 Leg-
islative bills with varying degrees of control on predatory 
lending activities are also likely to be introduced during the 
110th Congress.25
In  the  absence  of  additional  federal  regulations  pro-
hibiting predatory lending, some states and municipalities 
have  developed  local  legislation  that  sets  lower  triggers 
than HOEPA, requires additional disclosures, and/or bans 
a broader array of abusive practices.26 For instance, some 
prohibit prepayment penalties, limit broker “kickbacks” and 
excessive fees, restrict loan flipping, and ensure that hom-
eowners have a right to pursue meaningful remedies against 
foreclosure. As of September 2006, 28 states had enacted laws 
to restrict predatory lending, including California, Nevada, 
and Utah in the Federal Reserve’s 12th District.27,28 
State laws restricting predatory lending practices vary in 
their design and stringency, and advocates like the Center 
for Responsible Lending are encouraging more states to de-
velop legislation similar to that adopted in North Carolina. In 
1999, North Carolina became the first state to enact legislation 
to curb predatory mortgage lending. Research assessing the 
impact of this legislation has been largely favorable, although 
not universally so. Two studies, using a subset of loan data 
from nine lenders, cite a decline in subprime mortgages in 
North Carolina and argue that reductions in predatory lend-
ing had been attained at the expense of legitimate subprime 
lending activity, particularly to low-income borrowers.29 
Other researchers using larger datasets, however, have 
found  that  the  reduction  in  subprime  lending  has  been 
beneficial to consumers, in that the law has removed the 
riskiest loans without a concomitant decline in access to 
homeownership for low-income borrowers.30 Researchers at 
the University of North Carolina, for example, found that 
from 1998 to 2002, North Carolina did see a reduction in 
subprime lending, but that the effect was almost entirely 
in refinance mortgages, with almost 90 percent of the de-
cline attributable to a reduction in predatory loans.31 As 
the researchers conclude, the experience in North Carolina 
shows that it is possible to develop laws that combat preda-
tory lending without unduly restricting the flow of subprime 
mortgage credit.
Conclusion
In recent years, increasing the opportunity for homeown-
ership has been a policy priority at the federal, state and local 
level; within this context, high cost loans and elevated fore-
closure risk are in direct conflict with the vision of homeown-
ership as an asset-building opportunity for households and a 
stabilizing force in communities. Failure to protect consum-
ers from predatory lending and prevent avoidable foreclo-
sures could undermine much of the success that has been 
achieved in increasing the number of low-income and mi-
nority households that are now homeowners. Developing a 
comprehensive strategy to help sustain homeownership—par-
ticularly among low-income and minority homeowners—will 
ensure that homeownership remains a key vehicle for house-
hold financial security and neighborhood stability.  
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